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Abstract
Adopting successful climate change mitigation policies requires the public to choose how to
balance the sometimes competing goals of managing CO2 emissions and achieving eco-
nomic growth. It follows that collective action on climate change depends on members of the
public to be knowledgeable of the causes and economic ramifications of climate change.
The existing literature, however, shows that people often struggle to correctly reason about
the fundamental accumulation dynamics that drive climate change. Previous research has
focused on using analogy to improve people’s reasoning about accumulation, which has
been met with some success. However, these existing studies have neglected the role eco-
nomic factors might play in shaping people’s decisions in relation to climate change. Here,
we introduce a novel iterated decision task in which people attempt to achieve a specific
economic goal by interacting with a causal dynamic system in which human economic activi-
ties, CO2 emissions, and warming are all causally interrelated. We show that when the
causal links between these factors are highlighted, people’s ability to achieve the economic
goal of the task is enhanced in a way that approaches optimal responding, and avoids dan-
gerous levels of warming.
Introduction
An ongoing challenge facing society is how to minimize the negative impacts of global climate
change. As noted by Newell, McDonald, Brewer, and Hayes[1], tackling this problem requires
an understanding of how people think and reason about (1) environmental systems, and (2)
the (adverse) effects that human activities have on these systems. A key insight is that the prob-
lem of climate change mitigation can be understood in terms of the more general problem of
how people manage and control dynamic causal systems[2]. Osman[3] provided a recent
review of the multitude of tasks that have been developed to investigate how people interact
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with, and manage, dynamic systems, and the different classes of theories that have been devel-
oped to explain performance. A common finding is that people often lack insight into the
rules, or interactions among variables, that govern how these systems behave. It follows that
the mental models—the psychological representation of system variables and their effects—
people rely on to complete these tasks are lacking in important ways[4]. Generally speaking,
people’s mental models of complex systems inaccurately represent and/or relate variables to
one another[5], are missing important mechanistic relationships[6], and misrepresent the
underlying system dynamics[7]. It follows, then, that people’s ability to control causal dynamic
systems tends to be quite poor[3]. A practical challenge lies in identifying ways in which peo-
ple’s reasoning about causal dynamic systems can be improved, such that better management
and control outcomes can be achieved.
The need to improve the accuracy of people’s mental models is especially important for cli-
mate change mitigation. Several authors view an accurate mental model of climate change as a
necessary step toward adoption of effective mitigation policies[8–9]. However, it is known that
laypeople possess highly inaccurate mental models about the causes of climate change[10–13],
and that they do not accurately represent the stock-and-flow dynamics that govern the accu-
mulation of atmospheric CO2[14]. Because misconceptions about climate change dynamics
have been argued to encourage complacency with respect to climate change mitigation[15], a
goal of recent research has been to identify ways of overcoming the limitations of people’s
mental models to improve their understanding of climate change dynamics. These studies
have focused on improving people’s reasoning about accumulation dynamics in tasks with an
explicit environmental goal: to stabilize levels of atmospheric CO2[14,16–19]. In this article,
we build upon this work, by investigating performance in a novel repeated-decision task,
where people have an explicit economic goal to achieve—rather than an environmental goal—
but their progress toward that goal can be hindered by negative effects of global warming
within the system. We show that people’s ability to achieve the economic goal is tied to receiv-
ing accurate causal knowledge about the system variables. Causal knowledge about the interac-
tions between economic and climate variables within the system appears to bias people toward
more cautious means-ends pursuit of the economic goal. The effect of causal knowledge
appears to be robust over time and incremental changes in the state of the causal system, and
persists for over two hundred consecutive decisions.
We proceed by reviewing previous studies that have examined people’s ability to manage
accumulation dynamics in climate change tasks. We discuss some of the methodological limi-
tations of these studies before introducing our novel repeated-decision task. We then consider
how a naïve decision-maker might approach the task, based on causal model-based, exemplar-
based and hypothesis-testing perspectives on how people manage dynamic causal systems, and
consider how causal knowledge might affect performance through the lens of these theoretical
frameworks.
Accumulation dynamics and climate change: Previous studies
It is now well established that people often have difficulty controlling and accurately predicting
the behavior of systems that are defined by accumulation dynamics[7,20]. In these systems, the
quantity of a stock is affected by inflows and outflows to the system, respectively increasing
and decreasing the quantity of stock. As noted repeatedly by Sterman and colleagues, accumu-
lation dynamics of this kind are central to understanding climate change mitigation, as accu-
mulated CO2 can be viewed as a stock affected by inflows (i.e., anthropogenic CO2 emissions),
as well as outflows (i.e., natural carbon sinks, such as forests and oceans). Because warming is
driven by the accumulation of atmospheric CO2 emissions (i.e., whenever the rate of inflow is
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greater than the rate of outflow), it follows that climate change mitigation hinges, minimally,
on stabilization of the stock of atmospheric CO2.
Sterman and Booth Sweeney[14] introduced a climate stabilization task intended to assess
how people reason about accumulation dynamics applicable to climate change mitigation.
People were shown graphs illustrating the stabilization of atmospheric CO2 (the stock) at some
time in the future. People were also shown a graph of the recent history of CO2 emissions (the
inflow) along with the current rate at which CO2 was removed from the atmosphere (the out-
flow). The task was to sketch trajectories of emissions and passive CO2 removal—the latter
could effectively be assumed to be constant—that would achieve stabilization of the stock illus-
trated in the first graph. The results of this task showed that people frequently failed to identify
that stabilization of the stock could only be achieved when the rate of inflow (CO2 emissions)
matched the rate of outflow (passive removal of atmospheric CO2). Instead, people’s projected
emissions rates consistently exceeded the rate at which CO2 was removed, highlighting a fail-
ure to understand the fundamental accumulation dynamics that drive global warming.
Subsequent studies have sought to improve people’s performance on the climate stabiliza-
tion task by providing analogies to assist people’s reasoning. For example, Guy, Kashima,
Walker, and O’Neill[17] likened accumulation of atmospheric CO2 to water filling a bathtub,
and found that presentation of the bathtub analogy reduced the extent to which people overes-
timated emissions rates needed to stabilize CO2 levels. The effectiveness of analogy is not
unconditional, however, and depends on a number of other factors, such as level of education
[17], the presence or absence of graphical displays of inflows and outflows[17,19], as well as
the specific content of the analogy presented[18–19].
Extending previous research
A limitation of previous climate stabilization studies, such as those by Guy et al. [17], Newell
et al. [19], and Sterman and Booth Sweeney[14] is that people were not provided with an
opportunity to observe the accumulation dynamics of the system by interacting with it.
Moxnes and Saysel[18] investigated a version of the climate stabilization task where people
could observe the effects of emissions on CO2 accumulation over successive 10-year intervals.
They found that people who were able to observe the system dynamics in this way performed
better than people who did not have an opportunity to observe the effects of emissions on
accumulation. Similarly, Dutt and Gonzalez[21] investigated the effect of observing the system
dynamics, via interacting with the system, on subsequent performance on the climate stabiliza-
tion task. They introduced an iterated version of Sterman and Booth Sweeney’s[14] CO2 accu-
mulation scenario, where people were required to enter values that set rates of CO2 emissions
and removal of CO2 on a trial-by-trial basis to track the trajectory of the accumulated stock of
atmospheric CO2 through time. People who had the opportunity to observe the accumulation
dynamics by interacting with the system performed better on the climate stabilization task
compared to people who did not get a chance to interact with the system beforehand.
A more detailed examination of the way feedback about accumulation dynamics affects
people’s ability to manage a (simulated) climate system was reported by Dutt and Gonzalez
[16]. They presented people with an iterated version of the climate stabilization task, requiring
participants to keep CO2 concentration within a particular range of values on a trial-by-trial
basis. When CO2 levels exceeded the acceptable range for that trial, people incurred an eco-
nomic penalty—which affected whether they received a monetary bonus at the end of the
experiment—and thus had an opportunity to receive fine-grained feedback about their perfor-
mance in the task. This study found that people’s ability to stabilize the climate system over
the long-term was improved when feedback was more frequent and when system variables
Causal knowledge and self-regulation
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respond faster to changes in emissions levels. The latter echoes earlier findings that people
often struggle to stabilize dynamic systems that incorporate time delays and feedback loops
[22–23].
A common feature of previous research has been the use of tasks that include an explicit cli-
mate stabilization goal. In all of the key studies reviewed thus far, people were specifically
tasked with identifying a level of CO2 emissions that will stabilize the stock of atmospheric
CO2. This focus potentially ignores the role that economic factors play in shaping the stances
that individuals (and nations) are likely to adopt in relation to climate change mitigation. At
the level of individuals, economic concerns about wages and job availability heavily influence
people’s views about climate change intervention[24]. At the national level, economic down
turns are often associated with a decline in public concerns about climate change[25–26]. Sim-
ilarly, national and international decisions about climate change mitigation will be strongly
influenced by the estimated costs of climate change mitigation[27]. It follows that understand-
ing how people make decisions about managing the earth’s climate will be informed by, and
perhaps principally decided by, economic considerations.
Current study
In this article, we examine how people interact with a (simulated) climate system when their
goal is economic, rather than environmental, in nature. We further examine the effect causal
knowledge about the system variables has on people’s ability to achieve the economic goal. To
this end, we introduce a novel iterated decision task, where economic decisions are directly
linked to environmental outcomes, which, in turn, affect people’s ability to achieve an eco-
nomic goal. Like previous studies that have used iterated decision tasks[16,21], the responses
made by people in our task drive changes in the state of the climate system. That is, people’s
chosen actions produce emissions that affect the accumulated stock of atmospheric CO2, and
the level of global warming. Unlike previous research, the actions that people in our study take
are economic actions, rather than environmental actions. Instead of setting levels of emissions
directly—as in previous climate stabilization tasks—people’s responses drive changes to an
economy they are managing. In our task, people’s economic actions are not tied to an explicit
environmental goal. Participants are not instructed to stabilize CO2 levels, rather, their goal is
to grow the economy such that it is at least doubled by the end of the task. However, the cli-
mate and economic systems in our task are linked such that increases in warming make it pro-
gressively more difficult to achieve economic growth. By providing people with an explicit
economic goal, our task incorporates, in a novel way, a tension between achieving economic
growth on the one hand, and managing CO2 emissions on the other.
Task overview: Managing a dynamic human-climate system
In our task, people adopt the role of a policy director setting annual economic targets, with an
explicit goal to double the size of the economy by the end of the experiment. On each trial in
the experiment, people are shown numerical values reporting the current size of the economy,
concentration of atmospheric CO2, and global mean temperature. The participant then sets an
economic growth target, which updates the size of the economy, CO2 concentration, and tem-
perature. The relationship between variables in the human-climate system used in our task is
summarized schematically in Fig 1.
Formally, the changes in system variables are governed according to the following system
of equations, based on the MAGICC intermediate complexity Earth system model[28], which
describes the relationship between emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and tempera-
ture. On each trial of the experiment, indexed by i, the participant generates a response, Ri,
Causal knowledge and self-regulation
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which sets an economic growth target. The resulting economic activity generates a quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions, Gi, according to
Gi ¼ ½Ei þ expðRi þ sÞceff ; ð1Þ
where Ei is the size of the economic index on trial i, s is a scaling parameter indexing preferred
growth, and ceff is a carbon efficiency constant. Fig 2 lists values for constants used in the
model—these fixed parameter values were informed by recent calibration studies of the
MAGICC model against other climate models[28] and data[29]. The change in the economic
index in light of the response, Ri, is given by
ΔEi ¼ Ri   aTiEi; ð2Þ
where Ti is the level of warming on trial i, and α is an economic damage constant that deter-
mines the negative effect of warming on the economic index. A minimum value of 0 was
enforced when implementing trial-by-trial changes to the economic index.
Changes in emissions drive changes in atmospheric CO2 concentration according to
Δci ¼
Gi
p
 
ci
k
; ð3Þ
where ci is the level of atmospheric CO2 on trial i, p scales parts per million to gigatons of car-
bon, and κ is the rate at which CO2 is removed from the atmosphere by passive carbon sinks.
Eq 3 therefore summarizes the stock-and-flow relationship between atmospheric GHGs,
anthropogenic emissions, and carbon sinks in the environment.
Changes in temperature provoked by changes in CO2 concentration are given by
ΔTi ¼
sci
cpre
 
Ti
t
; ð4Þ
Fig 1. Schematic of the interactive human-climate model. Participants set an economic productivity
target, R, which drives economic growth, E, but also generates greenhouse gas emissions, G. Emissions
accumulate in the atmosphere, subject to passive removal by natural carbon sinks at rate κ. CO2
accumulation, c, generates warming, increasing the global mean temperature, T. Temperature has a negative
effect on economic growth. Capacity for economic growth is reduced under increased warming.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184480.g001
Causal knowledge and self-regulation
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where σ indexes the climate sensitivity, the effect doubling CO2 concentration over pre-indus-
trial levels, cpre, would have on global mean temperature. The parameter τ reflects natural time
delays associated with changes in global mean temperature.
The behavior of the human-climate model is summarized in Fig 2. The panels illustrate the
dynamics of the economic index, CO2 concentration, and warming under five different levels
of responding—for simplicity, constant economic targets are used in the figure.
To get intuition about the behavior of the system, it is useful to consider how changes in
responding affect levels of CO2, warming, and the economic index. Fig 2 shows that there are
strict order relations between responding and both CO2 and warming—higher levels of
Fig 2. Illustration of the human-climate model dynamics for five different levels of responding. Economic productivity targets of 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 percent are shown by the blue, green, red, cyan, and purple solid lines, respectively. Parameters governing the behavior of the
model are shown above the panels.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184480.g002
Causal knowledge and self-regulation
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economic activity result in increased emissions, and, in turn, increased warming. It is also
clear from the figure that these order relations do not hold for the economic index. Owing to
the harmful effect of warming on economic performance (Eq 2), the relationship between
responding and the economic index is nonmonotonic. Although setting high growth targets
early in the task generates substantial economic growth, the high level of emissions associated
with this response pattern makes it such that, toward the end of the task, high levels of warm-
ing prevent economic growth, leading to subsequent declines in the economic index. By con-
trast, lower productivity targets result in smaller, but sustained, economic growth over the
duration of the task.
Several other properties of the human-climate system are especially noteworthy. First, the
system is defined by time delays and multiple non-linear interactions among variables that are
not visible to the participant. These factors make it virtually impossible to predict the quantita-
tive behavior of the system through observation alone. Although people can uncover simple
causal structure—usually involving linear, but probabilistic, relations among variables with no
time delays—quite well through analyzing the effects their behavioral interventions have on
the system[30–32], people’s ability to predict and control systems with more complex dynam-
ics, like our human-climate system, can be quite poor[3,22–23]. Because our principal experi-
mental manipulation involves providing some, but not all, participants with causal knowledge
about the relationship between economic activities, CO2, and warming, having a low expected
baseline level of performance is advantageous. If causal knowledge from the outset of the task
confers a performance benefit, there should be ample room to observe its effect in the data.
The second noteworthy aspect of our task has to do with the presence of time delays within
the system[16]. In our task, people are able to adjust their responding across successive trials
to adapt to changes in the system state during the task. However, time delays in the system—
particularly with regards to temperature (Eq 4)—mean that, by the time the harmful effects of
warming on economic growth become apparent, even quite radical changes in responding
may not be enough to counteract the problem. Once warming increases past a certain point,
no level of responding will result in economic growth (Eq 2). A key question is whether people
are able to avoid this “point of no return” without causal knowledge of the relationship
between the economic and climate variables in the system.
Ways of approaching the task: Effects of causal knowledge
How might individuals respond in our task to achieve the economic goal of doubling the size
of the economy by the end of the experiment? How might people’s response strategies be
affected by causal knowledge of the system variables? Because people in our task have an
explicit economic goal to achieve (i.e., doubling the size of the economy) and a clear means of
achieving that goal (i.e., responding by setting large economic growth targets), we assume that
people will tend to adopt a means-ends approach to the task. That is, we expect people to set
economic growth targets that will promote rapid growth of the economic index, given the
absence of relevant causal knowledge. Because of the time delays involved in warming driven
by accumulated CO2 (Eqs 3 and 4), this pattern of responding will promote positive interim
outcomes—rapid progress toward achieving the economic goal of the task. Accordingly, it
would be predicted on the basis of instance theories[33], hypothesis-testing perspectives[34],
as well as causal model-based theories[35], that people would favor responding in this way for
the duration of the task. Once warming increases to the point where economic growth is
harmed—or even prevented—the predictions from these theories become less clear. Under
instance theory, people will not have a bank of similar trial instances to retrieve once economic
growth targets fail to achieve growth on a given trial, and so it is possible that people might
Causal knowledge and self-regulation
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persist in setting high growth targets. Under a hypothesis-testing framework, people may simi-
larly be expected to persist in setting high growth targets, as doing otherwise would result in
moving people away from achieving the economic goal (i.e., setting negative growth targets
would reduce the economic index). However, because high levels of warming would prevent
even high growth targets from increasing the economic index (Eq 2), people might attempt to
change their response pattern by inferring from feedback, that their current strategy is ineffec-
tive. Under a causal model-based approach, we would expect people to have developed a men-
tal model of the task that incorporates a strong positive relationship between growth targets
and approach toward the economic goal. Accordingly, people would be expected to persist in
setting high growth targets even after high levels of warming begin to limit increases to the eco-
nomic index (Eq 2).
When people have access to causal knowledge about the relationship between the climate
and economic variables in the system, we expect people to still apply a straightforward means-
ends approach to the task. However, we predict that people would adopt a more conservative
response profile, where relatively lower economic growth targets are set at the outset and per-
sist at relatively low levels for the duration of the task. The expected effect of causal knowledge
is perhaps most readily understood in terms of hypothesis-testing approaches[34] and causal
model-based perspectives[35], as people would be aware that allowing warming to increase
would have a strong negative effect on their ability to achieve the economic goal. It follows that
under both of these frameworks, people would be predicted to set more conservative economic
growth targets in an effort to avoid the harmful effects of warming on their ability to grow the
economic index. In sum, we expect that people will not manage the task well unless they are
provided with causal knowledge about the system variables at the outset of the task.
Overview of experiments
Our principal experimental manipulation involves a knowledge-based intervention where the
causal relationship among economic activities, CO2, and warming variables, is (Informed con-
dition), or is not (Uninformed condition) explicitly revealed to people at the outset of the task
(see S1 Text for details). Contrasting performance across the two conditions reveals whether
causal knowledge affects people’s ability to achieve the economic goal in light of the negative
effects of warming. Given that people are known to perform poorly in tasks involving non-lin-
ear systems with time delays[22–23], we expect causal knowledge to bias people’s interactions
with the system such that they favor more conservative responding. This will, in turn, improve
their ability to achieve the economic goal of the task and avoid harmful effects of warming.
We were also concerned that the labels for the system variables—specifically, CO2, and
warming—might introduce a demand effect, especially among our university sample in Exper-
iment 1, that could artificially bias people toward more conservative responding. To determine
whether any benefits of causal knowledge were restricted to variables involved in climate
change, we ran a separate version of the task using a different cover story involving fictitious
bacterial populations. Importantly, the system dynamics—based on known accumulation
dynamics involved in the carbon cycle—were identical across the two versions of the task (i.e.,
governed by Eqs 1–4). However, the labels for the system variables were different. Given that
knowledge effects are frequently found using a variety of cover stories in the causal learning lit-
erature[31,35–37], we expected similar results across the different cover story conditions.
Across two experiments, using a university student sample and a sample of the general pub-
lic, we show that causal knowledge improves people’s ability to achieve the economic goal of
our task whilst avoiding (economically) harmful levels of warming. We show that the benefi-
cial effect of causal knowledge is not restricted to the climate change domain: When the same
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system dynamics were presented in the context of managing a population of bacteria, the same
pattern of effects emerged, ruling out experimental demand characteristics and ideological
views on climate change as explanations for our data. Finally, we show that, when provided
with causal knowledge, responding approaches what could be considered an optimal profile
for the task.
Experiment 1: Australian university sample
Method
Ethics statement. Both experiments were approved by and conducted in compliance with
the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics Committee. After reading an informa-
tion sheet describing the task, participants in Experiment 1 signed and returned a consent
form to the experiment. In Experiment 2, which was conducted online, participants read
through an information screen prior to commencing the task, and indicated their consent
by agreeing to proceed from the information screen to the task itself via mouse click. All con-
sent procedures were approved by the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics
Committee.
Design and participants. The experiment was a 2 (Information Condition: Informed vs.
Uninformed) × 2 (Cover Story: Climate vs. Bacteria) between-subjects design. One hundred
first-year psychology students from the University of Melbourne were recruited in exchange
for course credit.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four experi-
mental conditions. All participants were provided with information describing the key features
of the task display and instructions that their goal was to maximize the Economic Index (or
Bacterial Population), and at least double it by the end of the experiment. Participants in the
informed conditions were provided with additional information describing the causal relation-
ships between human economic activity and the three climate variables. The causal knowledge
manipulation included the following text summarizing the relationships: “Economic produc-
tivity affects CO2 concentration, which in turn affects Temperature. Temperature increases
make it increasingly difficult to achieve economic growth. Due to time lags in the climate sys-
tem, the effects of CO2 on economic growth will only be felt after a considerable delay, after
which they will be difficult to reverse. Hence, it is advisable to keep CO2 concentration from
escalating too high.” (see S1 Text for complete instructions). The experiment was controlled
by a Matlab program designed using the Psychophysics Toolbox. Participants completed the
experiment individually on PC computers. The task took approximately 30–40 minutes to
complete.
The experiment began once participants had read the summary information about the task.
On each trial, participants were presented with a display containing current information about
the three task parameters, Economic Index, CO2 concentration, and global mean temperature.
They then set an economic target by clicking in the response box, which allowed participants
to aim to grow or contract the economy by up to five percent in either direction. Once a target
had been selected, participants confirmed their response before proceeding. Upon confirma-
tion, the human-climate system variables were updated to take on new values. Participants
were presented with the new values along with the relative changes before clicking a button to
proceed to the next trial.
Results
The results of Experiment 1 are summarized in Fig 3. For ease of exposition, we describe
results and effects using the variables labels from the climate change cover story condition.
Causal knowledge and self-regulation
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The four panels of the figure plot trajectories of people’s responses (i.e., economic targets)
along with trajectories of the size of the economy, excess CO2 concentration, and warming
(which are determined by the underlying system dynamics). Data were binned into 10 25-trial
epochs, and were averaged across participants within each condition. Data for each variable
(response, economic index, CO2, and temperature) were analyzed with a 2 (Information Con-
dition: Informed vs. Uninformed) × 2 (Cover Story: Climate vs. Bacteria) × 10 (Trial Epoch)
between-within ANOVA. Because of the large number of variables analyzed, we restrict our
discussion to the most relevant effects (see S1 Text for additional analyses).
Two clear patterns are evident in the economic targets selected by participants over the
course of the experiment (Fig 3A). First, participants in the Informed condition set more con-
servative economic targets than participants in the Uninformed condition, F (1, 96) = 50.41,
MSe = .001, p< .001, ηp2 = .34. Second, economic targets increased over the course of the
experiment, F (9, 864) = 24.42, MSe = 1e-5, p< .001, ηp2 = .20 (Fig 3A), indicating that (a) par-
ticipants were attempting to grow the economy to meet the explicit goal of doubling the size of
the economy by the end of the experiment, and (b) participants responded to the increased dif-
ficulty in achieving economic growth—because of the negative effect of warming on economic
growth (Eq 2)—by progressively setting higher growth targets. A trend analysis showed that
the changes in economic targets increased linearly across trial epochs, F (1, 98) = 83.87,
Fig 3. Data from Experiment 1. Panels show group averaged data for participant responses (a), economic index (b), excess CO2
concentration (c), and warming (d). Error bars are one standard error of the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184480.g003
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MSe< .001, p< .001, ηp2 = .46. No higher order trends were significant. Turning to the fol-
low-on effects of participant responses on the economic index and the two environmental vari-
ables, there are distinct patterns characteristic of the Informed and Uninformed conditions.
For the Uninformed participants, the economic index initially increased rapidly, but then
declined toward the end of the experiment. For the Informed participants, the economic index
steadily grew throughout the experiment. The difference between the economic trajectories
was supported statistically by an interaction between Information Condition and Trial Epoch,
F (9, 864) = 38.53, MSe = 772.34, p< .001, ηp2 = .29. Note also that Informed participants were
more successful at meeting the primary goal of the task, doubling the economic index by
the final Trial Epoch, in both the Climate, t (48) = 2.80, p = .007, r2 = .14, and Bacteria,
t (48) = 5.89, p< .001, r2 = .42, Cover Story conditions.
Similar patterns of differences between the Informed and Uninformed conditions emerged
for the CO2 and temperature variables—irrespective of Cover Story—as shown in Fig 3C and
3D. Uninformed participants achieved poorer environmental outcomes than Informed partic-
ipants, reflected in main effects of Information Condition for both CO2, F (1, 96) = 66.80,
MSe = 193860.94, p< .001, ηp2 = .41, and temperature, F (1, 96) = 66.14, MSe = 16.23, p< .001,
ηp
2 = .41.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 are readily summarized. Regardless of cover story, providing peo-
ple with knowledge of the causal relations among system variables improved people’s ability
to perform the task. The benefit of receiving this information up front is particularly interest-
ing, as learning by observing the effects of responses often results in successful performance
[30,32]. We believe that the complexity of our task, specifically, the incorporation of non-linear
dynamics and time delays contributed to the causal knowledge effect we observe here, as learn-
ing the precise behavior of the system through the effects of individual responses alone would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible. That the benefits of causal knowledge were sustained
across both cover story contexts implies that artificial demand characteristics or specific views
about climate change were not key drivers of performance in our task.
Experiment 2: United states general population sample
To generalize the Experiment 1 results to a broader population, we conducted an online repli-
cation study with a US sample recruited from the general population.
Method
Design and participants. The experimental design was the same as in Experiment 1. Par-
ticipants for Experiment 2 were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk, which has
been shown to replicate a multitude of benchmark results involving complex, multi-trial
experimental designs like ours[38]. Participant samples recruited via Mechanical Turk are
known to be demographically more diverse than university samples[39]. In total, 112 partici-
pants completed the experiment and were paid $3 in exchange for their participation. The
remuneration rate was commensurate with other psychological studies that have used
Mechanical Turk for participant recruitment purposes.
Materials and procedure. The general procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1,
except that the experiment was controlled using Python/Django routines for online presenta-
tion purposes.
The data from Experiment 2, presented in Fig 4, mirror those from Experiment 1. As in
Experiment 1, economic targets selected by participants increased over the course of the task,
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F (9, 972) = 10.13, MSe = 1e-6, p< .001, ηp2 = .09 (Fig 4A). A trend analysis confirmed that the
increase in economic targets was linear across trial epochs, F (1, 110) = 28.46, MSe< .001, p<
.001, ηp
2 = .26. There were also significant, but less readily interpretable, cubic, F (1, 110) =
6.53, MSe = 5e-5, p = .012, ηp2 = .06, and 8th-order polynomial trends, F (1, 110) = 5.08, MSe =
3e-5, p = .026, ηp2 = .04. No other trends were significant. Critically, there was an effect of
Information Condition reflecting lower, more conservative, economic targets being set by peo-
ple in the Uninformed condition relative to the Informed condition, F (1, 108) = 28.90, MSe =
.001, p< .001, ηp2 = .21.
The economic consequences of differential responding in the Informed and Uninformed
conditions are illustrated in Fig 4B. As in Experiment 1, Uninformed participants produced a
“boom-bust” economic trajectory, characterized by a sharp initial rise in the economic index
followed by decline over the latter portion of the task. By contrast, Informed participants
increased the economic index throughout the task, resulting in a significant interaction
between Information Condition and Trial Epoch, F (9, 972) = 18.60, MSe = 882.46, p< .001,
ηp
2 = .15. Like Experiment 1, participants in the Informed conditions were more successful at
achieving the economic goals of the task by the final Trial Epoch in both the Climate, t (54) =
2.27, p< .03, r2 = .09, and Bacteria, t (54) = 2.02, p< .05, r2 = .07, Cover Story conditions.
Fig 4. Data from Experiment 2. Panels show group averaged data for participant responses (a), economic index (b), excess CO2
concentration (c), and warming (d). Error bars are one standard error of the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184480.g004
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Experiment 2 produced CO2 and temperature trajectories that strongly resembled those
found in Experiment 1 (see Fig 4C and 4D). Uninformed participants produced poorer envi-
ronmental outcomes than Informed participants. Mirroring Experiment 1, there were main
effects of Information Condition for both CO2, F (1, 108) = 23.65, MSe = 299014.48, p< .001,
ηp
2 = .18, and temperature, F (1, 108) = 24.33, MSe = 24.84, p< .001, ηp2 = .18.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicate those of Experiment 1 with a general population sample.
We again demonstrate that the beneficial effects of causal knowledge are robust across cover
stories, implying that experimental demand effects did not have a strong influence over perfor-
mance in our task.
Optimal response analysis
Our analysis of the behavioral data showed that providing people with information about the
causal relationships between human economic activities, CO2 accumulation, and warming,
improved their ability to manage the human-climate system. Given the explicit economic
goals of the task though, a pertinent question is how well people could perform in our task,
given the instructions. To this end, we conducted an optimal response analysis. The aim of the
analysis was to identify the response profile that maximized the average of (1) the mean eco-
nomic index over the course of the task, and (2) the economic index at a time point beyond
the life of the task (i.e., at trial 300). These criteria map onto the instructions to (1) maximize
the overall economic index, and (2) aim to at least double the size of the economy by the end
of the task. For the latter criterion, evaluating the size of the economy at trial 300—rather than
trial 250—was chosen to reduce the influence of end-of-task artifacts associated with optimiza-
tion (e.g., excess warming will not penalize economic growth immediately due to time delays
in the human-climate system, which means that the optimal way to respond on the last 20–30
trials is to set the highest possible economic growth targets; see S1 Text for complete details).
For the optimal response analysis, we adopted a parameter estimation approach. For our
initial analyses, we divided the task into 25 equally-sized response intervals (i.e., for 300 trials,
each response interval comprised 12 trials). Using a standard simplex algorithm, we estimated,
for each interval, an economic target from the range of responses available to participants (i.e.,
the interval of -5 to +5), which maximized the joint optimization criteria. Our initial analyses
revealed that much of the estimated optimal response functions had a clear exponential form.
We also found that across different optimization runs, estimates for the early response inter-
vals were quite volatile. This makes sense, as the effects of the earliest responses can, to some
extent, be offset by later ones, given the optimization criteria we used. To improve stability and
better avoid local minima—and greatly reduce the time required for optimization—we consid-
ered an exponential response function,
Ri ¼ aexpðciÞ þ Δ: ð5Þ
In Eq 5, Ri denotes the response, or economic target set, on trial i, α is scaling parameter, c
determines the steepness of the exponential function, and Δ is an offset term. The optimal
response profile, along with the resulting economic and climate dynamics, is shown in Fig 5
alongside response trajectories and system dynamics for the informed and uninformed condi-
tions—averaged across both experiments and cover story conditions.
The optimal response profile is characterized by setting moderate economic growth targets
for much of the task—approximately +2.25—before progressively increasing responding
toward the end of the experiment. Although this ramping up of economic growth targets
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partially reflects an “end-of-task” artifact—due to time lags in the human-climate system, the
warming that would result from the increase in economic activity toward the end of the task
does not have sufficient time to provoke a reduction in the economic index (see Eqs 2 and 4)—
participants in our experiments also tended to increase economic growth targets in the latter
part of the task. The most striking aspect of the optimal response profile is in how similar it is
to performance of the informed participants over the course of the task. One implication is
that causal knowledge may lead people to behave in a way that is not only sustainable, but
more closely approximates optimal management of the human-climate system. This is consis-
tent with the idea that causal knowledge results in improved, but imperfect, performance in a
variety of causal inference tasks[40].
General discussion
A fairly common view among researchers is that adoption of effective climate change mitiga-
tion policies depends on people having an accurate mental model of the processes that lead to
global warming[8–9]. However, people have repeatedly been shown to struggle to understand
the fundamental accumulation dynamics that are involved[7,14]. We investigated the effect of
providing people with causal knowledge about the variables involved in CO2 accumulation
Fig 5. System dynamics associated with the optimal response profile (solid curves) overlaid with data from informed and
uninformed conditions (dashed lines). Data are collapsed across cover story conditions and across Experiments 1 and 2. The panels
show trajectories for responses (a), economic index (b), excess CO2 concentration (c), and warming (d). Error bars are one standard error of
the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184480.g005
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and warming in the context of a novel iterated decision task where pursuit of an economic
goal drove changes in the climate system. We showed that providing people with up-front
information about relevant causal relationships in the human-climate system resulted in
improved task performance, suggesting that people successfully used this causal knowledge to
guide their responding in the task. The basic pattern of results was replicated in a parallel set of
experiments that framed the decision task in terms of managing a fictitious bacterial popula-
tion, suggesting that the benefits of receiving causal knowledge were not restricted to variables
related to climate change. We further showed that receiving causal knowledge about the
underlying system resulted in decision-making performance that approached an optimal
response profile.
Limitations
Although our study extended existing work on the effect of knowledge in reasoning about cli-
mate change[16,21], it is not without its limitations. We discuss several limitations and poten-
tial concerns about (1) distinguishing effects of causal knowledge from response bias, (2) the
way economic activities were represented in the human-climate system, and (3) whether our
results will scale up from individual decision-makers to collectives.
As noted by reviewers, it is possible that our manipulation of causal knowledge simply
induced a favorable response bias in participants in the Informed condition. We acknowledge
that, while we cannot completely rule this out as a possible explanation, the fact that people in
the Informed condition produced response profiles that adapted to the changing demands of
the task—increasing economic productivity targets to potentially compensate for the negative
effects of warming on economic growth toward the end of the task (see Figs 3 and 4)—speaks
against a simple response bias account. Nevertheless it would be worth investigating whether
instruction to simply produce low economic growth targets early on in the task, without pro-
viding any other information about how the variables interact, would produce a different
response profile in the Informed condition than the causal knowledge intervention we used in
the current experiments. One possibility is that promoting a response bias (without causal
knowledge) would result in no difference in performance compared to the Informed condi-
tion. We suspect, however, that without causal knowledge, people may be reluctant to continue
making conservative economic growth targets when the system dynamics—at least in the early
stage in the task—provide no compelling reason to do so. Although people will achieve eco-
nomic growth when responding conservatively, exploration of the effects of responding with
higher economic growth targets would reveal that more rapid economic growth could be
achieved. Ultimately, this is an empirical question that awaits future research.
Another potential limitation of our study was in the way economic activities were imple-
mented in the human-climate system. Rather than having economic growth being character-
ized in terms of the aggregate of a number of different kinds of economic activities (e.g.,
different types of industry with potentially different carbon intensities), we relied on only a sin-
gle, monolithic, economic sector. We readily acknowledge that this limits the realism of our
human-climate system, but note that increasing the complexity of what is already a complex
system is likely to result in poor performance, which can create substantial difficulties inferring
people’s decision strategies from data[41–42]. Put another way, the (over-)simplified economic
aspect of our human-climate system is a feature, rather than a bug. It is nevertheless an inter-
esting question to investigate what effect, if any, providing people with different economic
response alternatives will have on people’s ability to manage the human-climate system.
Finally, we note that the current study investigated individual decision-making behavior,
whereas the problem of climate change mitigation is unequivocally a problem of collective
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decision-making. We conjecture that providing the public with better information about the
underlying causes of climate change—in addition to the strong scientific consensus on the role
of CO2 emissions—will produce decision-making benefits at the group level. As the proportion
of well-informed decision-makers increases, it is reasonable to suspect that the quality of deci-
sions made by aggregations of such agents will also be improved.
At the same time, results that identify highly polarized opinions along political lines implies
that provision of relevant information may not produce the desired effects on group decision-
making unless the information is presented in a way that resonates with diverse socio-economic
values[43]. Causal knowledge may yet be important though, as extreme political positions have
been shown to be relaxed when people holding such views are prompted to provide causal expla-
nations to support their views[44]. Fostering higher levels of knowledge about climate change
issues may serve to reduce the extent of polarization[45]. Ultimately, the tension between knowl-
edge, values, and polarization remains an interesting issue that warrants further research.
Relationship to climate change attitudes
An important question left open by our research is how a causal knowledge intervention,
which we have shown to influence people’s economic decision-making behavior, relates to
more general attitudes about climate change mitigation. It is now established that knowledge
about the causes of climate change is a key driver of climate change acceptance among the gen-
eral public[46–47]. At a more practical level, relevant causal knowledge about climate change
has also been shown to increase people’s intention to engage in mitigation behavior[48], as well
as levels of support for implementing climate change mitigation policies[49–50]. It follows that
possessing relevant causal knowledge about climate change dynamics—and the pivotal role
that human (economic) activities play in driving these dynamics—has the capacity to influence
how people think about the climate system, and importantly, consider how their actions might
adversely affect it[1]. At minimum, it seems that equipping people with relevant causal knowl-
edge will make achieving collective action on climate change more likely to happen.
Conclusions
The results of our study show that when people are made aware of the economic ramifications
of climate change, they alter the way they make decisions about satisfying an economic goal.
By showing a beneficial effect of causal knowledge on people’s decision-making, our study
reinforces the utility of knowledge-based interventions in advancing public debate on climate
change mitigation. Highlighting the critical role of human CO2 emissions in causing climate
change coupled with the economic risks posed by climate change produced a dramatic reduc-
tion in the economic targets people set. Specifically, people appeared able to forego short-term
economic gains if they knew that doing so would increase the likelihood that continued growth
over the long-term could be achieved. This resulted in long-term economic sustainability and
significantly better environmental outcomes (viz. less accumulated CO2 and less warming)
compared to when no causal information was provided. Given the role of causal knowledge in
evaluating the effectiveness of mitigation strategies and their socio-economic implications
[43,50], we believe our results reinforce the idea that relevant knowledge improves people’s
decision-making with regards to climate change mitigation.
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